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Abstract
Groundwater governance can be defined as the system of formal and informal
rules, rule-making systems and actor networks at all levels of society that are set
up to steer societies towards the control, protection and socially acceptable
utilization of groundwater resources and aquifer systems. Groundwater
resources are very diverse and groundwater governance is complicated by the
common pool nature of most groundwater resources, information gaps, and the
diversity of stakeholders and their interests. There are few comparative studies
of groundwater governance. This chapter contributes to that literature by means
of a high level comparison of groundwater governance in Australia, the
European Union and the Western USA. The comparison is structured using the
five categories of governance issues defined in the Earth System Governance
Project; architecture, access and allocation, accountability, adaptiveness, and
agency – defined in this case as management organisation. The EU WFD has
gone furthest towards an integrated framework to manage groundwater quantity
and quality objectives, but there are many implementation challenges.
Australia’s system of annually adjustable water entitlements and related water
markets provides security, efficiency and flexibility but it is not yet clear how
successfully environmental water allocations can be integrated within this
framework. The system of prior appropriation in the Western US provides
clearly defined priorities for water allocation, but lacks flexibility during extreme
droughts. Fully integrated groundwater management, as intended by theWFD, is
a very ambitious goal. The advantages of a strong central direction and coordi-
nation together with decentralised local management could be obtained through
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a decentralised system of collaborative planning and management at sub-basin
scales nested within an overarching groundwater planning framework at the
jurisdictional or basin scale. This system could take various forms in different
countries depending on social preferences and institutional settings and capacity.
6.1 Introduction
Groundwater makes up 30 % of the world’s freshwater and 99 % of the world’s
liquid freshwater. Groundwater supplies over 40 % of global irrigation water and
50 % of municipal water withdrawals. Two billion people depend on groundwater
for drinking water. The consumption of groundwater is growing rapidly driven by
increases in global population and agriculture and overextraction, and pollution of
groundwater is increasing in many parts of the world. This is reducing groundwater
reserves and harming rivers and lakes that are connected to groundwater (see
Chap. 2 for more detail on the scale of the groundwater problem internationally).
As groundwater is depleted supply costs increase leading to reduced access for the
poor (Wijnen et al. 2012). Therefore good governance, protecting groundwater
resources is crucial, for environmental, economic and social reasons.
Several features of groundwater and its use present challenges for its gover-
nance. Firstly, groundwater resources are not visible or well understood. The
impacts of groundwater use and pollution are often hidden, and only become
apparent over tens or even hundreds of years (Moench 2004, 2007; Wijnen
et al. 2012). Secondly, groundwater governance has to allow and account for the
large diversity of groundwater resources, users and use impacts. Groundwater is
also subject to a diverse range of point source and diffuse pollution. Thirdly,
groundwater is often subject to unsustainable levels of exploitation and depletion,
because it is a common pool resource – individual users cannot exclude others
(Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994). Fourthly, even when individual groundwater
users collaborate, they cannot be expected to manage remote impacts of groundwa-
ter pumping on other resources and the environment. Because of these features
groundwater governance is a complex process that requires coordination across
multiple spatial and time scales, sectors and administrative levels. Partnerships
between governing authorities and water users are needed to address these problems
(Schlager 2007; Blomquist and Schlager 2008).
The definition of groundwater governance in this chapter is adapted from the
definitions in the Earth System Governance Project (Biermann et al. 2009) and the
global diagnostic on groundwater governance (GEF et al. 2015). Groundwater
governance is defined as the system of formal and informal rules, rule-making
systems and actor networks at all levels of society that are set up to steer societies
towards the control, protection and socially acceptable utilization of groundwater
resources and aquifer systems.
There are few comparative studies of groundwater governance. This chapter
contributes to that literature by means of a high level comparison of groundwater
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governance in Australia, the European Union and the Western USA. The compari-
son is structured using the five categories of governance issues defined in the Earth
System Governance Project; architecture, access and allocation, accountability,
adaptiveness and agency – defined in this case as management organisation.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces
the importance and special features of groundwater. These features present a
number of challenges for groundwater management. The following section
discusses the challenges for groundwater governance in terms of the five issues
defined in the Earth System Governance Project. The main part of the chapter
includes a comparison of groundwater governance in Australia, the EU, and the
western United States. This is followed by a summary assessment of the strengths
and weaknesses of groundwater governance in the three regions and some gover-
nance difficulties and dilemmas.
6.2 Framework for the Assessment of Groundwater
Governance
Groundwater governance involves collective action to ensure socially-sustainable
utilisation and effective protection of groundwater resources for the benefit of
people and groundwater dependent ecosystems (Foster et al. 2009). Groundwater
governance as defined in this project refers to forms of steering societies that go
beyond government policy-making and include a wide variety of decision-making
structures and processes at all levels of society. These involve a wide variety of
non-state actors representing industries, scientists, environmental interests and
other parties interested in groundwater (Foster and Garduno 2013). In the remainder
of this chapter groundwater governance is analysed using a framework based on the
five issues defined in the Earth Systems Governance Project (Biermann et al. 2009).
The Earth Systems governance framework enables a large number of gover-
nance issues to be grouped into five major classes: architecture, access and use,
accountability adaptation and agency and some links between the five issue classes
are also established within the framework. Further details of this classification
applied to groundwater are given in Table 6.1 and in the remainder of this section.
Table 6.1 Classification of earth system governance issues
Architecture Central principles, policies and institutions that guide sustainable
groundwater use and protect groundwater quality, and interactions between
them
Access and use Institutions and procedures that determine who has access to groundwater, for
what purposes and how groundwater is allocated
Accountability Institutions and procedures that provide accountability for groundwater
protection and use
Adaptation How groundwater users, governments and third parties respond and adapt to
changes and uncertainty in groundwater availability, use and governance
Agency Private and public sector responsibilities for groundwater management
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The classification aligns with major themes of governance research and the frame-
work has been subject to extensive peer review and has now been in use for several
years.
6.2.1 Architecture
Groundwater extraction always creates an impact on other resources or the envi-
ronment somewhere in a hydrological system. Before extracting groundwater a
decision is required about the sustainable level of impact that can be accommodated
by the system. A sustainable yield can be determined by a combination of two
elements. Firstly, stakeholders negotiate a “consensus” or “acceptable” yield that
enables them to set management goals. The acceptable yield may be defined in
terms of specified resource condition targets. Secondly, scientists and engineers
calculate the “operational” yield – the amount of groundwater available through
different methods able to meet management goals (Richardson et al. 2011; Pierce
et al. 2011). Decisions about acceptable groundwater yield and resource condition
targets depend on political judgements about the weights that should be given to
consumptive and environmental water consumption now and into the future.
The difficulty of establishing quality standards for groundwater increases with
the variability of water quality and use over space and time. Groundwater quality
regulation requires definition of well-defined groundwater and environmental qual-
ity standards, indicators/measures that enable the achievement of those standards to
be assessed, criteria against which the success or failure of specific groundwater
protection strategies or interventions can be evaluated (e.g. compliance with envi-
ronmental quality standards) and evaluation of those interventions (Quevauviller
2008).
6.2.2 Access and Allocation
Comprehensive, well defined, secure legal entitlements provide incentives for
investment and collective water management (Ostrom 2005; Bruns et al. 2005). A
distinction needs to be made between appropriation of groundwater for private use
and provision of groundwater for public benefit. Water property rights give
individuals an incentive to make the best use of groundwater for their individual
purposes, but individuals do not have an incentive to provide groundwater for the
environment or to take account of “external” impacts of their use on resources that
are remote in space or time.
The collective allocation of entitlements to access and use groundwater is
appropriate because of the common property nature of groundwater resources and
the external impacts of their use. Collective allocation may be undertaken by
elected governments or by other organisations that represent stakeholders, both
water users and others. Access and allocation rules can be set out in legal
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documents such as in water plans, or more informally in local agreements (Tang
1992).
Water allocation describes the process that sets out how, by whom and on what
basis decisions are made about access to and use of water (Turner et al. 2004).
Water allocation processes take place on different sectoral and administrative
scales. Allocation refers to both the allocation of groundwater, and also responsi-
bilities and risks related to groundwater management. Clear allocation principles
and priorities are particularly important to deal with water scarcities.
Groundwater allocation can be assessed in terms of its effectiveness, efficiency
and fairness. Effectiveness is indicated by whether water allocations are sustainable
and meet quality standards. Efficiency is indicated by whether groundwater is
allocated or can be transferred to its most economically efficient use. Fairness is
indicated by whether people and communities have access to water of acceptable
quality to meet their needs. The allocation of groundwater access and use
entitlements is complicated by variation in legal authorities across administrative
boundaries, conflicts between competing users and uncertainties about future bio-
physical and social conditions (Blomquist et al. 2004). The agriculture sector is the
main user of groundwater in many countries, but many cities depend on groundwa-
ter. As agriculture develops and cities grow the access and allocation of groundwa-
ter becomes more challenging.
6.2.3 Accountability
Two important aspects of accountability can be distinguished. Democratic account-
ability refers to the institutions and procedures that provide public accountability
for groundwater abstraction and groundwater quality standards. Technical account-
ability refers to processes of monitoring and reporting about groundwater condition
and use. Both forms of accountability occur at multiple geographical and adminis-
trative scales.
Accountability and legitimacy issues have become increasingly important given
the increasing complexity of groundwater management organisations, which
include private actors and networks as well as elected governments. When central
government agencies govern groundwater they are democratically accountable to
the government of the country. However, centralised government agencies may be
disconnected from water users and communities, who may perceive government
decisions as not being consultative or legitimate (Gross 2011). When groundwater
is governed by non-government bodies such as water user groups or watershed
partnerships the lines of accountability are less clear. Such bodies may give
disproportionate influence to particular groups such as farmers but may also offer
opportunities for developing deliberative processes that are genuinely engage
citizens (Huitema and Meijerink 2012).
Accountability requires the effective measurement and monitoring of ground-
water use. This requires the installation of meters on individual wells and collation
of use data by managing bodies – government or non-government. Measurement,
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monitoring and reporting of groundwater use is complicated by the large number
and diffuse nature of groundwater users, and by the fact that many of the impacts of
groundwater use only become evident after many years (Moench 2007). In many
countries, the data available on both groundwater quantity and quality are poor and
not standardised compared to the data available for surface water (Biswas 1999).
6.2.4 Adaptation
Adaptation can be encouraged by institutional design or implementation processes.
Institutional adaptation allows for learning and change in response to unforeseen
situations, such as unexpectedly severe droughts or floods, and changing knowledge
and policy (Walters 1986; Pahl-Wostl 2007). Regulatory instruments and long-term
plans provide direction and certainty to water users but they can be relatively
inflexible in responding to change. Flexibility mechanisms such as adjustable
shares of volumetric water entitlements, carryover arrangements, water trading
and leasing have been built-in to groundwater regulations and plans in Australia
and the Western USA to improve adaptability (Ross 2012).
Adaptation is also encouraged by collaborative groundwater governance pro-
cesses that allow governments, water users and independent experts to collectively
learn, negotiate and co-produce groundwater management arrangements (Emerson
et al. 2012). It is not sufficient to get feedback through public seminars and
discussions. Ongoing engagement of and effective collaboration between policy
makers, scientists and practitioners is required (Letcher and Jakeman 2002).
6.2.5 Agency
A large variety of non-government as well as government organisations have been
given authority to establish and implement groundwater policies and standards in
different jurisdictions. Groundwater governance involves a large number of
individuals and agencies exercising a wide range of roles and responsibilities.
Groundwater governance has often been criticised as being too fragmented, includ-
ing too many agencies with unclear roles and responsibilities. However attempts to
streamline groundwater governance have proved difficult because of the wide
diversity in groundwater resource and user attributes.
Groundwater governance poses a cross scale management dilemma. High-level
governments can provide effective control, cross sectoral coordination and account-
ability, and can act flexibly to solve crises. However, hierarchical management can
become very complicated at the river basin or sub-basin scale and may displace
stakeholder and community action. Moreover, local governments and water users
often understand groundwater resources and their importance to communities and
the environment better than central governments (Ross 2012).
Special-purpose organisations, such as catchment management organisations in
Australia and water districts in the USA may provide a better match with
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hydrogeological boundaries, better local coordination, and encourage engagement
and innovation (Marshall 2005; Cech 2010). However, local organisations lack
knowledge and incentives to manage intertemporal impacts of resource use at a
river basin scale (Schlager 2007), and sometimes lack public accountability.
6.3 Groundwater Governance in Australia, the European
Union and the Western United States
6.3.1 The Context for Groundwater Governance
Increasing groundwater use in Australia, the EU and the USA underlines the
importance of good groundwater governance. Groundwater provides about 17 %
of water used in Australia, and much higher percentages in some regions and/or
during dry periods. Groundwater use is increasing rapidly. For example between
1993–1994 and 1996–1997 groundwater use tripled in New South Wales and
Victoria, the most populous states in Eastern Australia (the Australian Government
2001). By 2030 average groundwater use in the Murray-Darling Basin – which
includes the majority of Australia’s irrigated agriculture, is estimated to increase
from an average of 14 % to 27 % of the total water used (CSIRO 2008).
Groundwater supplies about 65 % of public water supplies in Europe (Jacques
2004), and 23 % of agricultural water. There are wide variations between the EU
states with a much larger proportion of agricultural water coming from groundwater
in southern Europe (EASAC 2010). In many rivers across Europe more than 50 %
of annual flow is derived from groundwater, and in dry periods this can rise to more
than 90 % (European Commission 2008).
In 2000 groundwater provided about 20 % of water consumed in the USA, 37 %
of public supply withdrawals and 51 % of drinking water. There is substantial
variation between the states, and in the arid Western USA there is substantial water
scarcity, groundwater over drafting and related problems including land subsi-
dence, saltwater intrusion and pollution. Groundwater use for irrigation has
increased substantially. In 1950 only 23 % of irrigation withdrawals were ground-
water, by 2000 groundwater’s share had risen to 42 % (Kenney et al. 2009).
6.3.2 Key Elements of Groundwater Governance in Australia,
the EU and the Western USA
Key elements of governance architecture, allocation and access, accountability,
adaptation and agency in Australia, EU and the Western USA are summarised in
Table 6.2 and described in the following sections of this chapter.
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6.4 Governance Architecture: Principles, Policies
and Institutions
Australia and the EU have both adopted broad scale (continental) water manage-
ment strategies with embedded groundwater components. The USA has not adopted
a single comprehensive water management strategy and relies on a more
decentralised approach using historical water allocation norms and principles –
prior appropriation in the case of the Western USA. Groundwater governance in
Europe is largely based on regulation, Australia has developed a mixed system of
regulation and markets, the USA has a polycentric groundwater governance system
with a mixture of instruments.
6.4.1 Australia
Groundwater management in Australia has been strongly influenced the trajectory
of surface water reform. Principles for water governance in Australia are contained
in the 1994 and 2004 Council of Australian Government (COAG) agreements on
Table 6.2 Key elements of groundwater governance in Australia, the EU and the Western USA



































































water reform. The 1994 COAG agreement included full cost recovery, separation of
water from land titles, integrated catchment management and the establishment of
water markets and trading (COAG 2004). The 2004 Intergovernmental Agreement
on a National Water Initiative (NWI), included the establishment of secure water
access entitlements, water access planning with provision for environmental and
other public benefit outcomes, the return of over allocated systems to sustainable
levels of extraction and further development of water markets, best practice water
pricing and national water accounting.
Section 23 of the NWI provides for “a nationally consistent market, regulatory
and planning based system for managing surface water and groundwater
resources”, while 23 (x) recognises “the connectivity between surface and ground-
water resources and connected systems managed as a single resource”. Surface
water and groundwater for human consumption and the environment are managed
within this framework but water quality is managed separately.
Under Australia’s federal system of government, the primary right to own or to
control and use water is vested with the States and Territories (Lucy 2008). The
States and Territories have enacted “mirror” legislation to incorporate the NWI in
state laws and regulations. Groundwater is allocated in accordance with priorities
established by the State governments. The 1992 Murray-Darling Basin agreement
placed a cap on surface water use (MDBC 2006), and included a formula for
allocating water among MDB jurisdictions, but there was no similar cap on
groundwater use, which continued to expand for a further decade.
The Australian Government’s Water Act 2007 requires that the new Murray-
Darling Basin Authority prepare an integrated surface and groundwater plan for the
basin. The Basin Plan was passed by the Australian Parliament on 26 November
2012. The plan includes sustainable diversion limits for groundwater resources, but
these have been criticised insufficiently recognising surface water groundwater
connectivity and for failing to take account of environmental impacts of groundwa-
ter pumping (Nelson 2012).
Groundwater quality is not included as a central objective or element in the
NWI. Water quality is subject to a separate agreements between Australian
governments, including the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality
and the National Water Quality Management Strategy (NWQMS). The NWQMS
contains detailed standards for water that is to be used for specific human consump-
tive purposes, which are included in state legislation, but groundwater quality
monitoring is generally poor. Groundwater salinity is increasing and groundwater
dependent ecosystems are threatened by over-extraction and poor groundwater
quality in some areas. Nitrate levels in some irrigated catchments exceed national
drinking water standards and ecosystem protection guidelines (Geoscience
Australia 2010).
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6.4.2 The European Union (EU)
The European Water Framework Directive (WFD) developed from a series of
earlier water directives which were driven by concerns to ensure clean water
supplies and to maintain environmental quality in the EU. The WFD is a legally
binding policy that provides a common framework for integrated management of
the quality of all types of water in Europe. The WFD came into force in
December 2000.
The primary objectives of the WFD are to protect and enhance water quality and
aquatic ecosystems and to promote sustainable water use. The WFD includes five
key elements; river basin management based on river basin plans, a combined
approach to pollution control linking emission limit values to environmental quality
standards, definition of “good water status”, the principle of full cost recovery for
water and increasing public participation in policy making (Page and Kaika 2003).
Good water status includes a focus on ecological status for surface water and
quantitative status for groundwater i.e. groundwater levels linked to the achieve-
ment of ecological objectives (Wijnen et al. 2012).
TheWFD is a supranational law which had to be transposed into domestic law of
the EU Member States. Parts of the WFD, especially the chemical status of water
bodies and the so-called priority substances contain specified standards. Environ-
mental standards have been set for surface water for 33 substances. The ecological
goal-setting process allows member states considerable freedom regarding both
policy process and policy output, e.g. targets and end goals for water bodies.
Implementation is flexible in several important ways including the designation of
the relative “modification” of water bodies, the degree of formalisation of goals and
environmental standards, scale of implementation, stakeholder participation, inte-
gration with other policy fields, and finally exemptions from general targets
(Liefferink et al. 2011). If member states fail to transpose the WFD the European
commission can initiate an infringement procedure before the European Court of
Justice which may impose financial penalties (Mechlem 2012).
The WFD (Article 4.1(b) (i and ii) require member states to implement all
measures necessary to prevent or limit the input of pollutants into groundwater,
to prevent the deterioration of the status of all bodies of groundwater, and to protect
enhanced and restore all bodies of groundwater, ensuring a balance between
abstraction and recharge with the aim of achieving good groundwater status within
15 years.
Groundwater provisions of the WFD require member states to define and
characterise groundwater bodies (within river basin districts), identify bodies at
risk of not meeting WFD objectives, establish registers of areas where groundwater
requires protection, establish groundwater threshold values (quality standards),
pollution trends, and measures to prevent or limit inputs of pollutants into ground-
water. Implementation of these provisions includes establishment of monitoring
networks, and inclusion of groundwater protection in river basin management plans
and programs of measures for achieving WFD objectives for each river basin
district (European Commission 2008).
154 A. Ross
River basin management plans were due to be submitted to the Commission by
2009 and programs of measures have to be in force by the end of 2013. However,
there are large differences between member states in the enforcement of EU
standards. More than 50 % of groundwater bodies in some southern European
states are at risk of not meeting WFP requirements because of the overpumping
and pollution (EASAC 2010).
6.4.3 Western USA
There is no overarching national strategic framework for water management in the
United States or across the western USA. Water for human use and the environ-
ment, and water quantity and water quality objectives are managed separately. Each
individual state has “plenary control” over the waters within its boundaries and state
of local governments set goals for regulating water use and water pollution.
In the Western USA the doctrine of prior appropriation was developed to set
water allocation priorities and to address disputes among landowners. The doctrine
includes four key elements; establishment of a water right by diverting water and
applying it to a beneficial use, and (once beneficial use was established) the right to
exclude others from using the same water, to use the water in allocation distant from
the source and to sell the water to third parties (Jones and Cech 2009). Subsequently
most western states adopted groundwater legislation that extended the doctrine to
cover groundwater (Schlager 2006).
State law underpins the doctrine of prior appropriation (Kenney et al. 2005). If
low stream flows prevent senior rights holders from diverting the water to which
they are entitled, the seniors put a “call” on the river, requiring all upstream rights
holders “junior” to the caller to stop diverting water until adequate streamflow is
restored (Howe 2008). In the prior appropriation system most groundwater rights
holders are relatively junior and have to make good their impacts on senior rights
holders. In times of water scarcity this can result in groundwater pumping being
terminated (Jones 2010).
Groundwater drawdowns and pollution have led to the choice between reducing
the take of existing users or restricting new development. In some cases groundwa-
ter users have successfully lobbied against restrictions leading to the ongoing
depletion of resources such as the High Plains aquifer (Sophocleous 2009).
The US Federal government has had a strong involvement in water development
and distribution, through major water projects and more recently through federal
environmental law (Kenney et al. 2005).
The Federal Clean Water Act (s102) provides for the development of compre-
hensive programs for preventing, reducing or eliminating the pollution of ground-
water used for human consumption. The Act (s106) also allows for funding to
support groundwater protection programs but in practice the costs of remediating
source water pollution are met by municipal governments and industry (GWPC
2007). Federal pollution control laws including the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
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Liability Act provide for landowners to be liable for point source pollution includ-
ing impacts on groundwater (Smith 2004). The Endangered Species Act provides
for the conservation of threatened and endangered plants and animals and their
Habitats, and is an important driver for environmental water provision.
Application of prior appropriation to groundwater has not prevented groundwa-
ter depletion in unconnected basins, while in connected basins it has prevented the
use of groundwater when surface water is scarce (Schlager 2006), Groundwater
quality controls are largely limited to point source pollution and sources of drinking
water, there are no systematic controls on diffuse pollution. Thomas (2009) argues
that the US would benefit from the adoption of a federal approach similar to the EU
groundwater directive to protect its groundwater resources.
6.5 Access and Allocation
6.5.1 Australia
Under the NWI Australia has adopted a framework of water entitlements that are
completely and transparently defined, separated from land wherever possible,
specified in registers, monitored and enforced (NWC 2009). Entitlements to access
water, to take water in a particular season/year and to use water at a particular place
and time for a specific purpose are separated from land ownership.
Surface water allocations are made to satisfy these entitlements in each season/
year as defined in the relevant State water plan and depending on the amount of
water available. During scarcities lower priority agricultural uses receive less than
the face value of their water entitlement. In most Australian jurisdictions the
separation of water entitlements from land promotes the development of water
markets and trade in water.
The allocation of shares of total available groundwater is more difficult to clearly
define. Groundwater availability is often defined according to proportion of long-
term recharge that can be extracted without compromising the integrity of the water
source and the ecosystems and communities that depend on it.
The use of groundwater has been restricted in a limited number of management
areas on the basis of exploitation of, or stress in surface and/or groundwater
resources. In some highly exploited stressed groundwater systems, annual
allocations of a share of water entitlements have allowed authorities to control
groundwater exploitation without compulsory reduction of entitlements (NWC
2006). Cease to pump rules are applied to some groundwater resources to maintain
minimum flows in connected streams. However, there is no systematic national
approach.
The efficient allocation of resources has been boosted by the development of
water markets but the effectiveness of the protection of groundwater resources is
complicated by the overallocation of water use entitlements (Young 2010), and the
failure to properly account for impacts on groundwater use of surface water
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resources (Evans 2007). There are a range of community perceptions about fairness
in water allocation, in particular there is some disagreement about the balance of
allocations between water for the environment and irrigation (Connell et al. 2007).
6.5.2 The EU
In the EU the entitlement to use water is generally given by public authorities
through licences and permits. Water allocation is carried out by different authorities
and agencies at different levels. Authority to pump groundwater is generally given
through permits that refer to the quantity of water abstracted and/or pumping
capacity. Permits are issued for varying periods of time in different states. In
some states including France, Germany and the UK environmental impacts are
considered when granting permits.
National authorities have powers to restrict abstractions during times of water
scarcity or drought. Some countries such as Netherlands, Spain and France deter-
mine restrictions according to a hierarchy of water users. Priority may also be given
to particular sectors, or sometimes within sectors, for example for specific crops
(European Commission 2012).
Also the WFD sets a “good quantitative status” for groundwater which implies
an obligation to ensure a balance between (natural) recharge and abstraction over a
river basin management cycle. However, the implementation of the programme of
action that has followed the groundwater directive has concentrated on water
quality issues rather than over abstraction.
Regulation of groundwater has not kept pace with the rapid growth in ground-
water use in terms of both users and volumes used. Different member states use
different combinations of instruments to manage groundwater resources. In some
parts of the EU land-use control is the main instrument. For example in the UK
environmental agencies have defined source protection zones for some 2000
groundwater sources. In many parts of the EU there are regimes for groundwater
protection including the licensing of boreholes. However, in many of the southern
European states the number of unlicensed users is growing rapidly (EASAC 2010).
The effectiveness of the Water Framework Directive is being reduced by slow
implementation because of the different degrees of ambition and cohesion of the
efforts of member states (Liefferink et al. 2011), and technical challenges including
information processing (Hering et al. 2010). In southern Europe where the eco-
nomic and social dependence on groundwater takes precedence over ecological
considerations a difficult balance has to be struck between the social benefits of
current consumption and the broader social and ecological benefits of conserving
water dependent ecosystems (EASAC 2010). European water markets for quality or
quantity are not well developed, reflecting a European emphasis on administrative
water allocation and regulations on water quality. These institutions may be rela-
tively efficient for European conditions, but there are opportunities for markets that
can deliver greater amounts of cleaner water at lower costs (Zetland 2011).
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6.5.3 The Western USA
In the Western USA groundwater access and allocation has been regulated by the
operation of the prior appropriation system. Water access and allocation reflects
common-law courts decisions from the late 19th and early twentieth century.
Surface water rights are generally senior to groundwater rights.
Prior appropriation has worked differently when applied to aquifers compared to
surface waters. It has also applied differently to groundwater resources unconnected
to surface water (non-tributary) and connected (tributary) resources (Schlager
2006).
In the case of non-tributary groundwater priority acts to limit the number of well
permits issued but does not prevent declining water tables. Reasonable declines in
water tables are allowed. It is up to state courts to determine what constitutes a
reasonable decline on a case-by-case basis. State governments have not intervened
to limit the issue of well permits until aquifer depletion and/or negative impacts on
other users have become serious. In the case of tributary groundwater, prior
appropriation has been adapted to allow some groundwater pumping while
protecting senior surface rights. Groundwater pumpers have been allowed to
pump water if they can provide water to augment stream flows to prevent injury
to surface water users (or the environment). This system prevents long-term over
abstraction of tributary groundwater, but it can discourage efficiency because water
is forfeited if it is not used within the statutory time period (Neuman 2010) and it
prevents the use of groundwater during droughts when it is most needed (Schlager
2006).
Further modifications of state water allocations based on prior appropriation
have been needed to allow for the fact that hydrologic systems do not stop at state
boundaries (GWPC 2007) and pumping can harm senior water rights in adjoining
states. In order to deal with this problem interstate agreements have been negotiated
to address cross-border impacts of water use.
Environmental water allocation is managed separately from water for consump-
tive use and the fairness of the prior appropriation system can be challenged in the
sense that it does not service changing social preferences such as environmental
water requirements. Federal environmental laws including the Clean Water Act and
the Endangered Species Act provide the main driver for environmental water
provision, often through an interstate compact. For example, the South Platte
Compact requires that between April 1 and October 15 Colorado must ensure
river flows do not fall below 120cfs.1 Colorado has also committed to making
10,000 acre feet of water available between April and September of each year to
assist recovery programs for three endangered birds and one endangered fish
(Freeman 2011).




In Australia there are several levels of democratic accountability for groundwater
management. The National Water Commission (NWC) has responsibility for
reviewing the implementation of the NWI and reporting to the Australian govern-
ment. The NWC has published biennial reviews of the NWI. State and Territory
water authorities have responsibility for establishing groundwater management
plans, and monitoring and enforcing these plans. These authorities report progress
to their own government and also to the NWC.
The NWI provides that governments engage water users and other stakeholders
in water planning and other reform processes in order to improve certainty and
confidence, transparency and information sharing. State water legislation includes
provision for consultation in relation to water plans, but consultation often appears
more symbolic than real, because it takes place after policy changes have been
made and/or does not take sufficient account of stakeholder views (Bowmer 2003).
Australian and international experiences show how communities can use collabo-
rative water planning processes to manage cuts to water allocations (Richardson
et al. 2011) and for flood and drought risk management (Daniell et al. 2010).
The NWI requires all jurisdictions to ensure adequate measurement, monitoring
and reporting systems are in place. The capacity of State and Territory governments
to monitor groundwater resources and plans is mixed. Some resources, especially
the most highly exploited resources, have relatively good metering and monitoring,
but many resources lack basic metering, measurement and monitoring infrastruc-
ture. There is a national program to develop this infrastructure. Monitoring of
groundwater quality is limited and carried out in an ad hoc manner. There is no
consistent national program on groundwater quality monitoring and much of the
monitoring has been short term (Geoscience Australia 2010).
6.6.2 The EU
Democratic accountability for the implementation of the WFD is complex with
local areas reporting to national governments and parliaments who in turn report to
the European Community and Parliament. EU member states and the European
commission have jointly developed a Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) for
supporting the implementation of the WFD. A Strategic Coordination Group (SCG)
composed of Member States and stakeholder organisations coordinates cooperation
on implementation.
Groundwater planning and allocation systems have high levels of democratic
accountability to national governments, and the European Parliament, but some-
times are not perceived as legitimate at local levels because of lack of community
participation and deliberative processes. TheWFD requires governments to provide
information about planned measures and to report on implementation to
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stakeholders and the general public. It remains a challenge to ensure public access
to reliable and consistent information about measures, and to motivate and facilitate
public participation (De Stefano et al. 2013).
The SCG has developed guidance documents on groundwater monitoring and
groundwater protected areas and is developing guidance on compliance and
impacts of land use on groundwater. Measurement, metering and monitoring
capability varies substantially among the EU member states, and between regions
within the states. EU wide coverage and long-term series of water quality data are
not available, and the analysis of water quantity is insufficient in many river basin
plans – only 25 % of plans include water availability scenarios and less than 20 %
assess data uncertainty.
6.6.3 Western USA
State governments are accountable for groundwater management. There is no
national accountability mechanism except in the case of transboundary aquifers
where there are interstate agreements, and where federal courts or the Supreme
Court are responsible for the agreements.
Water management in the US is fragmented, with many overlapping
jurisdictions and agencies. Stakeholder engagement, information sharing and
accountability is effective across parts of the system but it is very difficult to ensure
good communication and consultation across the whole system. Groundwater is
governed by a network of water users, water courts and administrative authorities.
Groundwater management arrangements are accountable and are perceived as
legitimate at a local level, but are not necessarily democratically accountable or
perceived as legitimate at a broader level.
There are many gaps in information about groundwater availability and use and
there is a need to improve the effectiveness of coordination of groundwater
information and data. There is no regular national review or monitoring of ground-
water use. The US Geological Service issues periodic reports. The latest covered
groundwater use in 2010 (Maupin et al. 2014).
The Clean Water Act (s 106(e)) requires the USEPA to determine that a state is
monitoring water quality including groundwater. Thirty states have included some
groundwater monitoring in their water monitoring strategies but most of the
emphasis is on surface water monitoring.2 From 1991 the US Geological Survey
(USGS) has implemented a National Water Quality Assessment Program that
includes groundwater assessments. The USGS has identified 62 regionally exten-
sive aquifers and is carrying out assessments of about one third of them, but most
aquifer assessment and monitoring is carried out by the states, and the quality of the
programs is highly variable (GWPC 2007).
2 GWPC-NGWA survey of State groundwater programs, 2006.
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6.6.4 Monitoring – A Common Challenge
Australia, Europe and the Western USA face similar technical accountability
challenges because of shortfalls in groundwater metering and monitoring infra-
structure. It is difficult to centrally manage groundwater monitoring because
groundwater abstraction is very diffuse. On the other hand groundwater users and
local governments often have insufficient mandate or resources to put broadscale
monitoring programs in place.
6.7 Adaptation
6.7.1 Australia
Section 25 (iv) of the NWI provides for adaptive management of surface water and
groundwater systems in order to meet productive, environmental and other public
benefit outcomes. The National Water Commission undertakes biennial reviews of
the implementation of the NWI, but it is left for states to determine how often to
review water plans in their jurisdictions. Under the new Murray-Darling Basin plan
the Murray-Darling Basin Authority will review state water resource plans, which
will usually have a 10 year life cycle.3
In the Murray-Darling Basin flexibility is introduced into water allocation in
three ways. Firstly water is allocated to entitlement holders on an annual basis
depending on water availability. Secondly surface water and groundwater entitle-
ment holders have a limited capacity to carryover water entitlements for later use.
Thirdly, surface water and groundwater trading provides some extra flexibility for
water users, including the potential to purchase additional water to make up
shortfalls in allocations during dry periods, if there is water available for purchase.
However, groundwater trading volumes have been relatively small in the Murray-
Darling Basin and there has been no recorded surface water and groundwater
trading (Ross 2012).
6.7.2 The EU
The EU WFD adopts an adaptive water planning approach. National water
authorities adopt management plans, including quality standards and programs of
measures for water districts for 6-year periods. These plans are monitored and
evaluated and the WFD recognises that quality standards and programs of measures
may need to be modified in the following 6-year period. However, the legal systems
of some member states are not sufficiently flexible to respond to new situations and
information.
3 http://www.mdba.gov.au/draft-basin-plan/delivering-healthy-working-basin/ch03. Accessed 5
April 2013.
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The WFD recognises the importance of adaptive mechanisms but they are dealt
with through parallel processes including the EU water scarcity and drought policy
developments. In 2007 the European Commission released a communication on
water scarcity and droughts that laid down a water hierarchy including demand
management followed by alternative supply options once the potential for improv-
ing water efficiency had been exhausted. This text is, however, not legally binding.
A Commission review of this policy (European Commission 2012) found that
while member states have established mechanisms for authorising groundwater use,
illegal abstractions remain an important challenge in some parts of Europe. There
has been only limited implementation of drought risk management plans, and cost
recovery and price incentive mechanisms.
In practice the main flexibility mechanism in the WFD is the degree of freedom
given to member states to set groundwater standards and implementation
timetables. This approach reflects heterogeneity in the member states, but could
result in slow improvements in standards which would reduce the effectiveness of
the WFD.
6.7.3 Western USA
The prior appropriation system deals with uncertain water supply and shortages by
setting clear priorities for allocation of scarce water based on seniority. Junior water
entitlement holders must relinquish water in times of shortage. This system
provides certainty in the face of changing water supplies but is not very flexible
in responding to changing social preferences for the use of water such as demand
for new urban development, provision for in stream flows or conjunctive water
management. In addition conflicts are resolved by litigation which can be slow and
not very responsive to unanticipated crises needing urgent responses.
Adaptive management is gaining a foothold in some agencies like the National
Marine Fisheries Service and the U.S. Forest Service, but state water management
agencies have a restricted role and responsibilities, to manage the allocation of
water for consumptive use or to control water to ensure consumptive supplies.
Water quality and water for the environment are managed separately. Because of
these management settings water management agencies are not at the forefront of
strategic adaptive management (Neuman 2010), although they do provide some
leadership in information collection, monitoring and the development of local water
allocation plans (Wolfe 2008).
In practice the law of prior appropriation has included provisions for reducing
allocations of water to users in response to risks including water scarcity, wasteful
or non-beneficial use or displacement by “public rights”. On the other hand junior
entitlement holders including municipalities and groundwater groups have obtained
enough political power to secure continued allocations (Tarlock 2001). For exam-
ple, local water plans in Colorado have enabled flexible implementation of the prior
appropriation system, without requiring junior groundwater entitlement holders to
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cease production, except in the most extreme drought conditions (Blomquist
et al. 2004).
Water trading and leasing provide further flexibility mechanisms. In Colorado
there is a significant amount of water trading, mainly transfers from agricultural to
municipal users (Howe and Goemans 2003). Water leasing has enabled farmers to
lease part of their water portfolio to municipalities and to reduce their acreage
temporarily through crop rotation or fallowing (Pritchett et al. 2008).
6.8 Agency
6.8.1 Australia
Historically, surface water and groundwater planning, rule development and admin-
istration have been separated in Australian jurisdictions. The historical separation
of surface water and groundwater science (hydrology and hydrogeology) has
reinforced the administrative separation. These separations have hindered the
development of integrated water management. Water management and allocation
in the Australian states is highly centralised in the hands of responsible ministers
and their departments. Surface water and groundwater policy and planning are
coordinated at the highest levels of decision-making, but often separate at lower
levels.
Government representatives generally consider that policy and implementation
functions are integrated effectively. But some water users consider that state water
managers do not provide enough information and that some functions are poorly
integrated. For example, in the Namoi region in New South Wales, users cited as
examples of poor integration the separation of management of overland flows, stock
and domestic bores, and issues related to water in the mining sector from other
water planning and allocation processes. Local and regional bodies could play a
more effective role in water planning and management if there were increased
delegation of responsibility to these bodies, increased funding or fund raising
capacity and support from high level leadership.
6.8.2 The EU
The EU Water Framework Directive initiated the move from national and local
water management towards river basin planning, but generally EU member states
adapted existing management and administrative bodies to implement the WFD
maintaining long-standing water management institutions.
Groundwater governance in Europe is generally coordinated by national
authorities, sometimes concentrated at the level of member states and sometimes
decentralised to regional and local levels. There is a large diversity of management
organisations. Many small states such as Denmark have a relatively top-down
approach, whereas the large states exhibit a greater diversity of multilevel
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governance agencies. In Denmark the Minister for Environment is responsible for
river basin management plans, whereas in the Netherlands the competent authority
is the Minister for Transport, Water Management and Public Works. In the
Netherlands regional water authorities and water boards have a strong role in
implementing the WFD.
River basin authorities have a leading role in a small number of member states.
France had already adopted a river basin approach before the WFD was conceived
and adapted the existing structure of the river basin and sub-basin plans to imple-
ment the WFD (Liefferink et al. 2011). Water user groups play an important role in
a limited number of countries including Spain. European countries will benefit from
continued experiments with groundwater governance and representation from dif-
ferent levels of government, water users and experts.
6.8.3 Western USA
Federal water-related agencies and programs are fragmented and require better
coordination. More than 30 federal agencies, boards, and commissions in the
United States have water-related programs and responsibilities (Christian Smith
et al. 2012). The allocation and distribution of water is subject to regulation by state
water resource agencies, and is ultimately in the hands of thousands of farmers,
hundreds of irrigation districts and a large number of municipalities and industries.
Local groundwater supply and distribution is managed by regional and local
water entities, such as mutual water user companies and cooperatives, irrigation
districts, conservancy and conservation districts. These organisations provide a
crucial link between state laws and policies and individual water users. In some
states water districts play an important role in encouraging regional coordination
and innovation. In most cases organisation members democratically establish
policy and elect management Boards. The organisations are non profit and raise
revenue by assessments on shares (mutual companies), on acreage allotments
(irrigation districts), or taxes on land or water sharing assessments (conservancy
districts) (Freeman 2000). Municipal users and irrigators initiated the South Platte
Water Related Activities Program to ensure that instream flow and endangered
species obligations are met (Freeman 2011).
Decentralised groundwater management in the Western USA has encouraged
many institutional innovations but management effectiveness could be could be
improved by strategic watershed planning that integrated consumptive and envi-
ronmental requirements, and gave governments and water users an opportunity to
adjust the prior appropriation doctrine in order to achieve improved water manage-
ment outcomes.
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6.8.4 The Influence of Vested Interests
In all three regions historically powerful water authorities and water users exert
substantial influence and sometimes resist change. The protection of groundwater
dependent ecosystems is an ongoing challenge. Strong leadership and broad com-
munity engagement are needed to progress reforms in groundwater management.
6.9 Comparative Assessment of Groundwater Governance
in Australia, the EU and the Western USA
Drawing on the analysis in the previous section the main strengths and weaknesses
in groundwater governance in Australia and the EU and the Western USA are
summarised in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 Strengths (+) and weaknesses () of groundwater (GW) governance in Australia, the
EU and the Western USA
Australia EU Western USA
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The EU WFD has gone furthest towards an integrated framework to manage
groundwater quantity and quality objectives and human and environmental uses of
groundwater. The discretion for member states to set their own standards and
implementation timetable provides flexibility but also threatens to undermine
effectiveness of the WFD. Australia’s comprehensive system of water entitlements
and related water markets together with annual adjustment of entitlement shares
provides security and flexibility for consumptive users and encourages efficient
water allocation. But it is not yet clear how successfully environmental water
allocations can be integrated within this framework. The system of prior appropria-
tion in the Western US provides clearly defined priorities for water allocation, but
lacks flexibility during extreme droughts. Neither the Australian nor the US systems
effectively protect groundwater quality or groundwater dependent ecosystems.
Australia, the EU and the Western USA face common groundwater governance
challenges. Firstly, the effectiveness of policy and plan implementation varies
substantially within the regions. Secondly, there are substantial knowledge gaps,
measurement and monitoring is expensive and is highly variable. Thirdly, powerful
stakeholders conspire to prevent change when it threatens their interests.
6.10 Some Groundwater Governance Difficulties
and Dilemmas
Experience with groundwater governance in the EU, Australia and the Western
USA raises some unresolved dilemmas relating to relationships between aspects of
groundwater governance.
Is a Comprehensive Integrated Groundwater Governance Architecture
Feasible or Desirable?
A comprehensive system of groundwater governance would integrate the manage-
ment of groundwater quantity and quality for consumptive and environmental
purposes. Only the EU WFD attempts to integrate all four elements. This has
proved to be an ambitious goal, and in practice full integration has not been
achieved. In Australia the management of groundwater quantity and quality is
carried out by separate institutions and in the Western USA all four elements are
separated, with variable degrees of coordination in different regions. Degrees of
separation of the four elements may be acceptable providing that there are effective
coordination mechanisms, which raises the question of what those mechanisms
would be.
What Coordination Arrangements Are Appropriate for Groundwater
Governance?
Groundwater governance involves some particular coordination challenges. Firstly,
groundwater resources and user groups are very diverse. Different management
rules are appropriate for different resources and users. For example different rules
will be appropriate for a shallow alluvial aquifer highly connected to a river
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compared with a fractured rock aquifer remotely connected with surface water.
Secondly, the boundaries of groundwater resources, their flows and their
interactions with surface water and the environment are often not well understood.
Hence centralised groundwater governance can be very complicated, and ground-
water governance is typically organised at multiple geographical, sectoral and
jurisdictional scales. A multilevel groundwater governance model including
elements of central control and accountability, together with decentralised, partici-
pative local agencies is discussed below.
Thirdly, long-term coordination raises special difficulties. The impacts of
groundwater use on other resources and the environment can be delayed by many
years, decades or even centuries. When long-term impacts are discounted using a
“market” discount rate long term impacts have a negligible value. This implies that
long-term impacts of groundwater overuse will be considered relatively unimpor-
tant compared to short-term impacts, and the maintenance of long-term stocks of
groundwater will be considered less important than preserving jobs and environ-
mental icon sites. If discount rates were chosen by means of a deliberative process
involving commercial developers, community representatives and user groups as
well as governments chosen rate could be lower (or higher) than the average market
rate. Community discounting is not the current practice and could be expensive but
it could better reflect community views and aspirations for the future (Ross 2012).
How Can Central Control and Stability Be Balanced with Adaptiveness?
Well defined, secure entitlements and rules about the use of groundwater increase
confidence in and support for groundwater management. At the same time
mechanisms that allow the flexible use, storage and exchange of groundwater
over time are required to optimise groundwater use in response to changes in
climatic and market conditions and new knowledge. There are some working
examples of arrangements that combine security and flexibility. The allocation of
tradable water entitlements coupled with annual calculation of water available to be
used by water entitlement holders has proved to be an effective means of
responding to drought in Australia, but requires the prior issue of individual
tradable water entitlements – without overallocation. The wide variety of
innovations introduced by water districts and communities in the Western United
States show the potential for decentralised collaborative groundwater management,
although these institutions may lack broad democratic accountability.
How Can Central Direction Setting and Coordination Be Balanced with Local
Agency and Responsibility for Groundwater Governance?
In practice groundwater governance is typically polycentric, involving a network of
governments and their agencies, and special purpose organisations. Participation by
groundwater users in decision making is necessary to ensure that users understand
each other and have the opportunity to craft mutually acceptable management
arrangements taking account of relevant information and uncertainties (Emerson
et al. 2012; Ross 2012). This can be achieved by a multilevel approach including
both jurisdictional and/or basin wide overviews of water resources and uses and
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detailed management arrangements for individual resources. This multilevel
approach can avoid the difficulties involved in drafting and communicating a
fully detailed management plan at the river basin or jurisdictional scale, but at the
same time ensure a coordinated approach to water management consistent with
broader social and policy goals. Higher level governments will need to overcome
their reluctance to give control to decentralized organisations (Marshall 2005; Ross
2008).
6.11 Conclusions
In this chapter groundwater governance in the EU, Australia and the Western USA
has been compared using an analytical framework drawn from the Earth System
Governance Project. While the high-level international comparison yields some
interesting results, the analysis masks many regional and local variations in the
study regions.
The EU WFD has gone furthest towards an integrated framework to manage
groundwater quantity and quality objectives, but there are many implementation
challenges. Australia’s system of water entitlements and water markets coupled
with variable annual water allocations provides security and flexibility for con-
sumptive users. But neither it nor the US system protect GDEs or prevent diffuse
pollution of groundwater. While the US system provides clearly defined priorities
for water allocation, it lacks flexibility during extreme droughts.
Fully integrated management of all sources of water, as intended by the WFD, is
a very ambitious goal. The advantages of a strong central direction and coordination
together with decentralised local management might be obtained through collabo-
rative planning and management at sub-basin scales nested within an overarching
groundwater planning framework at the jurisdictional or basin scale. This system
could take various forms in different countries depending on social preferences and
institutional settings and capacity.
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